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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, t 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : Case No. 890124-CA 
v. i 
ERLENE KAY STRIEBY, i Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction for manslaughter, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205 
(Supp. 1989). This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether sufficient evidence was presented during 
the State's case in chief to overcome defendant's motion for 
judgment of acquittal. 
2. Whether sufficient evidence was presented at trial 
to support the court's verdict and its subsequent denial of a 
motion for new trial. 
3. Whether the trial court properly ordered the 
payment of restitution, the amount to be determined by the Board 
of Pardons at the time of defendant's release. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The language of the provisions upon which the State 
relies are included in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Erlene Kay Strieby, was charged with second 
degree murder, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. S 76-5-203 (Supp. 1989) (Record [hereinafter R.] at 2-3). 
Defendant was convicted of the lesser included offense 
of manslaughter, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. S 76-5-205 (Supp. 1989), on November 30, 1988, 
following a bench trial, in the Third Judicial District Court for 
Tooele County, State of Utah, the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup, 
Judge, presiding (R. at 86). Defendant was sentenced by Judge 
Rigtrup on January 9, 1989, to a term of one to fifteen years at 
the Utah State Prison, and ordered to pay restitution in an 
amount to be determined by the Board of Pardons at the time of 
release (R. at 86). On January 18, 1989, defendant filed a 
motion for new trial (R. at 87-88). On February 8, 1989, the 
motion was denied (R. at 114-116). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On July 8, 1988, at approximately 6:30 p.m., Sandy 
McGanna heard a noise outside of her home, went to her window and 
observed the defendant, Erlene Kay Strieby, "coming down the 
sidewalk out of her condominium" (Record [hereinafter R.] 136 at 
126-127). Defendant then approached Ms. McGannars door and asked 
her to call the paramedics because she had just shot her husband, 
Chris Strieby (R. 136 at 128-130). Defendant explained to Ms. 
McGanna that her husband had been hitting her "[a]nd the only way 
to get him to stop was to shoot him" (R. 136 at 130). 
At 6:38 p.m., Deputy Lynn Bush of the Tooele County 
Sheriff's Office responded to a report of a shooting at the 
Strieby residence, #9 Mill Pond in Stansbury Park (R. 136 at 17). 
Upon his arrival, Deputy Bush saw defendant standing outside of 
the residence near the street curb (R. 136 at 18). Defendant was 
upset and appeared to have a swollen lip, swollen eyes and a mark 
on her forehead (R. 136 at 38-39, 41). Deputy Bush entered the 
residence and immediately observed Chris Strieby, to the deputy's 
"left up the stairs on the stair landing", lying supine with his 
head "in an awkward position" against a broken landing window (R. 
136 at 19, 22). Deputy Bush checked Mr. Strieby for vital signs, 
but found "no signs of life" (R. 136 at 22). Also on the 
landing, next to the body, was an empty blue plastic cup and a 
hat (R. 136 at 26, 41). 
A second officer, who had accompanied Deputy Bush into 
the residence, testified that defendant said "the gun was in the 
bedroom" (R. 136 at 23). Deputy Bush went to the bedroom and saw 
a .357 magnum pistol lying on a nightstand (R. 136 at 23). 
Deputy Bush testified that there were no signs of disruption or a 
struggle within the residence itself, "[n]othing out of the 
ordinary, except Mr. Strieby" (R. 136 at 24). 
Detective Sergeant Alan James of the Tooele County 
Sheriff's Office was called in to investigate the shooting (R. 
Deputy Bush testified that he could not tell whether the 
swollen eyes were the result of an injury or of defendant's 
crying (R. 136 at 39). 
136 at 136). Upon his arrival, Detective James met with 
defendant, who, after being informed of her Miranda rights, 
voluntarily agreed to give a recorded statement concerning the 
events leading to the shooting (R. 136 at 137-139). Defendant 
explained that an argument had occurred the night before the 
shooting, which escalated at defendant's father-in-law's trailer 
the following afternoon: 
K.S. [Kay Strieby]: Okay, I cussed him 
really bad last night and I just went to bed 
I have to get up at 4:00 in the morning to go 
to work and he I took the truck and went to 
work and I come up to his dad's, I went up to 
the Eagles and I had a couple of drinks cause 
I said I needed em' because I did. 
A.J. [Alan James]: Urn hm. 
K.S.: And he had slept with another women 
the other night and I asked him about it and 
he said he didn't, but he just said it didn't 
matter anyway. And I just told him he was a 
dirty rotten son-of-a-bitch. 
A. J.: Urn hm. 
K.S.: In his dad's trailer, I said you dirty 
rotten dirty son-of-a-bitch and I did yell 
and scream and carried on. He knocked me 
down and beat the hell out of me up there. 
(State's Exhibit [hereinafter St. Exh.] #14 at 2). Defendant 
explained that, following the heated physical argument at her 
father-in-law's trailer, she returned home and sent Mr. Strieby's 
nephew to pick up Mr. Strieby (St. Exh. #14 at 2, 8). When Mr. 
Strieby returned, defendant was lying on an upstairs bedroom bed, 
"drinking a beer because of all that happened at the trailer 
today" (St. Exh. #14 at 7). She said: 
And he come in yelling at me and called me a 
cunt and 
Anyway he said I'll kill ya. He said I'll 
beat you to death no wonder your first 
husband beat you. Your a mouthy bitch. And 
I said just leave me alone, I don't need 
anymore and he started up the stairs and I 
said Chris damn you don't and he said go in 
the closet, go get the gun, point it at me, I 
don't care. He says you are a tough cunt, 
you can do it. And I said Chris it's not 
loaded, please don't be stupid. He said no 
it isn't loaded, and it was. It was loaded. 
It was loaded. He said it wasn't loaded and 
it was loaded. Oh my God. 
(St. Exh. #14 at 2-3). Defendant explained that Mr. Strieby hit 
her 
[i]n the shoulder and the arm and pushed me 
up the stairs. 
And he'd already done this and that at the 
trailer. But I just told him please Chris 
just leave me alone, I just, give me a couple 
a days and he was grabbing me and shaking me 
downstairs so I ran upstairs . . . . 
2 (St. Exh. #14 at 4). After running up the stairs to her 
bedroom, the defendant retrieved the gun from a closet, then 
confronted defendant somewhere near the landing separating an 
upper and lower flight of stairs. She told James: 
[H]e said it isn't loaded. It wouldn't hurt 
anybody and there wasn't enough dust to kill 
a Strieby. And I was really upset and I said 
bullshit and went and got the gun and I said 
either you just get out of here Chris right 
2 
Sometime later, defendant told Detective James she had been 
dragged down the steps by her leg (R. 136 at 163). 
The stairway has a lower flight of stairs commencing at the 
entryway up to the landing, a 180° turn at the landing, and an 
upper flight of stairs leading to the second floor (R. 136 at 
22). 
now and he said no, he said I'm not, it's my 
house. 
I said okay it's your house, but give me a 
couple of days and he said I ain't giving you 
no time at all, and then I really don't 
remember, I just I said Chris you can't be 
like this and he said he'd kill me, he'd beat 
me to death he said if the beatin you thought 
you got at dad's trailer was bad today, you 
wait until I get ahold of you again and I, I 
just shot . . . . 
(St. Exh. #14 at 4). Defendant later explained: 
I wanted to scare him because he scares me. 
All I said was please don't ever hit me again 
and he said pull the trigger you fucking 
bitch, cause it ain't loaded and I can make 
it up the stairs before you pull it anyway. 
And I, I just got scared, I don't remember 
pulling it. I know it hurt my arm. . • . 
(St. Exh. #14 at 8). After Mr. Strieby fell against the landing 
window, defendant ran to the neighbors "to tell them to call an 
ambulance because he fell down and he wouldn't move" (St. Exh. 
#14 at 3). 
After the interview, Detective James continued with his 
investigation. Upon entering the residence, he observed Mr. 
Strieby lying face up on the landing, "obviously dead" (R. 136 at 
142). Lying next to the body was a plastic cup and a 
multicolored cap. Detective James testified that, near the cup, 
"the carpet was damp" approximately "three or four inches" in 
diameter (R. 136 at 144). Detective James then proceeded to the 
upstairs' bedroom where he recovered a .357 magnum, noting that 
the weapon contained "five live rounds" with the "one under the 
hammer . . . empty" (R. 136 at 145). 
At trial, the events leading to the shooting were 
substantially clarified by the testimony of several witnesses. 
Adolph Chip Lis and Don McCord were employed by Strieby Welding 
and were acquaintances of both Mr. Strieby and defendant. The 
witnesses established that on the day of the shooting, July 8, 
1988, defendant arrived at the welding shop sometime around noon 
(R. 136 at 47, 66). Defendant confronted Mr. Strieby and an 
argument ensued. Lis testified, "Kay [defendant] seemed to be 
upset with Chris [Mr. Strieby] over something, and then Chris 
retaliated with being angry" (R. 136 at 48). The argument lasted 
approximately five to ten minutes, after which the defendant left 
in Mr. Strieby's truck (R. 136 at 49, 67). 
That afternoon, while the witnesses and several others 
were eating inside the trailer, defendant returned (R. 136 at 50, 
68). Mr. Strieby had consumed approximately half of a fifth of 
vodka (R. 136 at 72). It was also apparent that defendant had 
been drinking (R. 136 at 73, 74). Immediately, an argument began 
between defendant and Mr. Strieby, which waxed and waned over the 
next hour, ultimately ending in a physical confrontation (R. 136 
at 51-55, 74-79).4 Don McCord testified: 
. . . Kay lunged at Chris and tried to hit 
him, and there was a drink spilt. And Chris 
fell down by the sink and got up. And she 
come at him again, and he stiff-armed her [in 
the neck], like that (Indicating). 
It appears consistent with defendant's statement to the 
police (St. Exh. #14 at 2) that the argument arose after 
defendant learned that Mr. Strieby had spent a night with another 
woman several days earlier (R. 136 at 68-70). 
[T]hen a little wrestling match. 
[I]n the scuffle, they slipped in this drink 
that was spilt, and fell with their heads 
more or less between the refrigerator and a 
chair that was sitting there into a garbage 
can, and then the garbage can was upset in 
the shuffle. 
I think that the side of her head hit that 
garbage can, but — either that or the chair, 
I don't know. But I know she — when Chris 
finally — they got up, why, Kay had a red 
mark on the side of her face and on her neck. 
She wound up on the bottom. He was trying to 
hold her hand, or hold her wrists. 
[T]hen they got up, and they was arguing back 
and forth obscenities and threats and this 
and that and the other thing. 
She made a comment, something like, "I 
hope" — "I hope you feel real big about 
beating up on a woman in front of your 
buddies here," or -your friends here." 
She said as soon as she got her hands on a 
gun, he was a dead SOB. 
(R. 136 at 74-79). Adolph Chip Lis also observed the 
confrontation: 
Kay jumped up and started screaming at 
Chris again. And pretty soon Chris, you 
know, just kind of slid his chair back and 
stood up (Indicating). And she shoved him, 
and he fell over on the hot stove. And I was 
watching the whole thing because the action 
started happening. So I turned and looked. 
And when he shoved her — or she shoved 
him, he fell into the hot stove on his arm. 
And then he come back up off that stove 
pretty quick. And she was swinging at him 
with her left hand, and Chris reached out to 
grab — he went forward, being as he came off 
of that stove pretty fast, and straight line 
(Indicating), hit her throat. And he 
still — they went tumbling into the fridge. 
. . . Not against the door, but by the side 
next to the door. 
Chris fell on top of her. 
Chris says, "Don't you ever hit me!" 
[He was j]ust kind of holding her down by the 
throat. Wasn't squeezing her, but real kind 
of just held in place pretty good. 
Then he figured she had calmed down enough, I 
guess he let her get back up. And she went 
out the door shortly after that. 
(R. 136 at 52-54). While defendant and Mr. Strieby often argued, 
the argument that afternoon appeared more intense than usual (R. 
136 at 81, 86). Following the argument, defendant contacted 
Charlotte Gourley who took her home (R. 136 at 82). 
Joseph Gruenwald, Mr. Strieby's nephew, testified that 
after defendant arrived home, she asked him to Mgo pick up [Mr. 
Strieby] from the shop because she didn't want him driving home 
drunk" (R. 136 at 106). Gruenwald noticed defendant had a 
"little cut up on her eye" and possibly a swollen lip (R. 136 at 
105). Gruenwald proceeded to pick up Mr. Strieby and arrived back 
home at 6*25 p.m. (R. 136 at 106-108). After their arrival, 
defendant came out and got Mr. Strieby's truck keys, then 
returned to the house (R. 136 at 109). Moments later -she had 
come out and yelled something at Chris . . . a frustrated yell, 
like 'Come on'" (R. 136 at 109-110). Gruenwald left at 
approximately 6:30 p.m. (R. 136 at 111). When Gruenwald returned 
at approximately 1:30 a.m., he noticed nothing unusual except for 
the broken landing window (R. 136 at 112). 
Dr. Edwin Steven Sweeney, M.D., of the State Medical 
Examiner's Office examined the body of Chris Strieby on July 19, 
1988 (R. 136 at 114). Dr. Sweeney confirmed that the cause of 
death was from a "gunshot wound to the head" (R. 136 at 115). 
The bullet had entered through Mr. Strieby's mouth and lodged in 
the second cervical vertebrae (R. 136 at 116, State's Exhibit 
#13). Dr. Sweeney testified that Mr. Strieby's blood alcohol 
content "was .25 milligrams percent" (R. 136 at 117). 
Following the State's case in chief, the defendant 
moved for a judgment of acquittal (R. 136 at 165). The motion 
was denied without prejudice (R. 136 at 168). 
Defendant took the stand in her own defense. She 
testified that she had known Mr. Strieby for approximately three 
years before they were married on April 15, 1988 (R. 137 at 218). 
At the time of the marriage, Mr. Strieby was unemployed and had 
experienced "a falling out with his family" (R. 137 at 220). 
In June of 1988, he went to work at his father's 
welding shop (R. 137 at 223). Although defendant and Mr. Strieby 
"drank usually every day", when Mr. Strieby became employed at 
the shop he began to drink more than before (R. 137 at 224). 
On July 7, 1988, defendant and Mr. Strieby Mgot into a 
heated argument over sex" (R. 137 at 230). Mr. Strieby had 
indicated that "if he didn't get sex pretty soon, he was going to 
go someplace else for if (R. 137 at 229). Approximately 15 to 
20 minutes later, after defendant had gone to bed, Mr. Strieby 
entered the bedroom and attempted to have sex (R. 137 at 230). 
Defendant "pushed him off the bed, and . . . [he] crawled back 
downstairs" (R. 137 at 230). Defendant was also mad about a 
separate incident when Mr. Strieby "had stayed out at that 
woman's house before when he got drunk . . . [and] had lied about 
if (R. 137 at 251). 
The next morning, defendant got up and went to work at 
her job in Grantsville (R. 137 at 231). After work, defendant 
returned home, did some housework, and began preparing dinner (R. 
137 at 232). At approximately 12:30-1:00 p.m., defendant left 
and went to the welding shop, were she and Mr. Strieby argued (R. 
137 at 233). Defendant left the shop and drove to a local club 
(the Eagles), where she consumed eight drinks, or "about four 
mini bottles," and was admittedly under the influence of alcohol 
(R. 137 234, 260). Defendant went to the welding shop at 
approximately 3:00-3:30 p.m., in order to pick up Mr. Strieby (R. 
137 at 234). Observing no one outside, defendant entered the 
trailer: 
I opened the door, and threw the keys at 
Chris. I was mad at him because of what he 
had done before. I just threw the keys at 
Chris, and told him, "Here is the keys to 
your truck. You don't have to hotwire it. 
Why don't we go home." 
(R. 137 at 235). A heated argument ensued and defendant -tried 
to slap his face11: 
He grabbed me by the arm and reached up and 
grabbed my shirt and twisted it and pushed me 
to the floor by the fridge. 
Chris held me to the floor, and told me never 
to try to slap him again. And called me a 
few more names. He had my shirt all this 
time bunched like this (Indicating). And 
then he just let go and let me up. And he 
sat back down in his chair. 
(R. 137 at 235-36). Defendant later indicated that the couple 
did not fall, "he just put me to the floor . . . put me to the 
floor" (R. 137 at 254).5 Defendant then left with Charlotte 
On cross examination, the following colloquy took place; 
Q. And that he pushed you, and you both fell 
down? 
A. We didn't fall. He just put me to the 
floor (Indicating); put me to the floor. 
Q. Do you recall any alcoholic beverages 
being spilled on the floor and slipping on 
that? 
A. No, I don't 
Q. So when you were down on the floor, I 
don't recall what you said happened. What 
happened on the floor? 
A. He just held me there. 
Q. How did he hold you? 
A. He still had my shirt (Indicating), and 
he just held me to the floor. We were 
verbally talking back and forth. 
Q. So he grabbed you by the arm and grabbed 
your shirt and pushed you to the floor and 
told you never to hit him again. 
A. Yes. 
[Q.] At that time, he let you up, is that 
correct? 
A. Yes. 
(R. 137 at 253-55). 
Gourley (R. 137 at 238). 
When defendant arrived home, she sent Mr. Strieby's 
nephew to pick up Mr. Strieby (R. 137 at 239). Defendant then 
opened a beer, and "went upstairs to lay down" (R. 137 at 239). 
When Mr. Strieby arrived home, another heated physical 
confrontation ensued (R. 137 at 240). Defendant testified that 
during a barrage of insults, Mr. Strieby "was pushing and shoving 
me . . . [a]nd I pushed and shoved him" (R. 137 at 240). As 
defendant attempted to exit the front door, Mr. Strieby slammed 
it shut (R. 137 at 241). Defendant then "pushed" Mr. Strieby and 
ran up the stairs, but he pulled her back down (R. 137 at 241). 
Defendant then pushed herself back up on the stairs "and kicked 
at Chris" (R. 137 at 242). She "[p]ushed him up against the 
wall" (R. 137 at 242), causing Mr. Strieby to lose his balance: 
And he just — he wouldn't stop; pushing 
and pulling. He had me by my shoulders, and 
shaking me. I pushed him away, and he'd lose 
his balance. He slid down the wall once. 
And when he got up, he grabbed at me. And I 
kicked him in the groin. I pushed him, and 
he went into the kitchen. 
(R. 137 at 243). Defendant testified that when Mr. Strieby 
attempted to strike her, she "moved, and he went clear to the 
stairs with his fist" (R. 137 at 242). She testified that she 
got away from him a "couple of times", being "faster than he was 
at the time to get away" (R. 137 at 263). Defendant then pushed 
Mr, Strieby once again, and "he went into the kitchen • . . all 
this time telling me he was going to kill me" (R. 137 at 243). 
Defendant indicated she "got away because he lost his balance a 
couple of times" (R. 137 at 262-263, 266, 268). 
Mr. Strieby broke off the confrontation and went into 
the kitchen and defendant ran upstairs (R. 137 at 242, 245). 
According to defendant, Mr. Strieby continued to yell threats and 
insults (R. 137 at 245). Defendant could not recall where she 
obtained the weapon, stating only MI know that I had the gun in 
my hands and was at the top of the stairs when he was rounding 
the stairs to come up the second flight." (R. 137 at 246). 
Defendant admitted that she knew the gun was loaded (R. 137 at 
271, 273). As Mr. Strieby rounded the corner of the stairs, she 
fired a single shot, striking him in the face and killing him 
instantly (R. 137 at 247). Defendant then placed the gun on the 
bedroom nightstand and went to the neighbors for help (R. 137 at 
279). 
Dr. Mark Anderson, a physician with the Tooele Valley 
Hospital, examined the defendant following the incident on July 
8, 1988. Dr. Anderson testified that defendant appeared to have 
several injuries, including what initially appeared to be a 
cervical fracture (R. 137 at 196). Defendant also had "a swollen 
left eye, a fresh rug burn of the left elbow, fresh bruising of 
the upper arm" and an abrasion or bruise on the forehead and neck 
(R. 137 at 200, 201). Dr. Anderson indicated that the type of 
injuries sustained by defendant were consistent with either being 
dragged down steps or with a person falling down and struggling 
with someone on a kitchen floor (R. 137 at 203, 210). However, 
Dr. James acknowledged that defendant did not have any 
bruising of the buttocks, or complain of any new back pain, which 
would be consistent with someone being dragged down a flight of 
stairs (R. 137 at 208, 211). 
the bruises, with the exception of the hand grasp, were not 
consistent with a person having been "seriously attacked by a 
strong individual" (R. 137 at 214).7 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly denied defendant's motion for 
judgment of acquittal at the conclusion of the State's case in 
chief. The requirement to survive such a motion is only that the 
State have presented sufficient evidence to establish the prima 
facie elements of a cause of action. Since the absence of self-
defense is not a prima facie element of a cause of action, the 
State was not required, at that juncture, to prove the absence of 
self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court had the 
option of determining that the State had established the prima 
facie elements of second degree murder or any of the lesser 
included offenses of that charge in order to deny the motion. 
The verdict reached by the trial court is not clearly 
erroneous and is supported by the clear weight of the evidence. 
Since the evidence presented in this case is sufficient to uphold 
the verdict, it was not error for the trial court to deny the 
motion for new trial which was based on the same sufficiency 
argument. 
Because defendant did not object at trial to the 
court's order of restitution, she is precluded from raising that 
argument on appeal. Even if the issue had been preserved, the 
7 
When cross-examined by the prosecutor, Dr. James testified 
that the three linear bruises on defendant's arm appeared to be 
consistent with someone grasping her. He acknowledged that the 
bruising was as consistent with someone grabbing her arm to 
restrain her as someone "throwing [her] around" (R. 137 at 214). 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering restitution. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL FOLLOWING 
THE STATE'S CASE IN CHIEF. 
At the conclusion of the State's case in chief, the 
defendant moved for judgment of acquittal, claiming that the 
State had failed to meet its burden of proof. Defendant 
specifically argued, and now argues on appeal, that "the State 
failed to prove in its ovm case, beyond a reasonable doubt, that 
Mrs. Strieby [defendant] did not act in self-defense." (R. 136 
at 165-168, Brief of Appellant [hereinafter Br. of App.] at 12). 
Notably, defendant has erroneously placed the burden of 
proof for this stage of the proceeding at "beyond a reasonable 
doubt", when, in fact, the prosecution was only required to 
establish a prima facie case. A motion for judgment of acquittal 
in a criminal proceeding is governed by Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-3 
(1982) and Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-17(o) (1982). Section 77-17-3 
provides; "When it appears to the court that there is not 
sufficient evidence to put a defendant to his defense, it shall 
forthwith order him discharged." Section 77-35-17(o) states: 
At the conclusion of the evidence by the 
prosecution, or at the conclusion of all of 
the evidence, the court may issue an order 
dismissing any information or indictment, or 
any count thereof, upon the ground that the 
evidence is not legally sufficient to 
establish the offense charged therein or any 
lesser included offense. 
(emphasis added). The interplay of those two statutes was 
explained in State v. Smith, 675 P.2d 521, 524 (Utah 1983). In 
Smith, the Utah Supreme Court said: 
Motions for directed verdicts in criminal 
proceedings are governed by U.C.A., 1953, S 
77-17-3 and Rule 17(o) of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure (U.C.A., 1953, S 77-35-
17(o)). Section 77-17-3 requires the 
immediate discharge of a defendant when there 
is not sufficient evidence to put him to his 
defense[.] 
This section is founded on the basic concept 
that a defendant need not adduce any evidence 
in his defense unless the prosecution first 
adduces believable evidence of all the 
elements of the crime charged. Only then 
should the defendant be put to his proof. 
Rule 17(o) of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure is not inconsistent with § 77-17-3. 
Rule 17(o) authorizes the dismissal of an 
entire information or indictment, or any 
count thereof, either at the end of the 
State's evidence or at the close of all the 
evidence[.] 
Rule 17(o) merely recites the traditional 
rule that a trial judge may dismiss an 
information or indictment, or any count of an 
information or indictment, either at the 
close of the State's evidence or at the 
conclusion of all evidence, if the State's 
evidence at the close of its case in chief 
does not establish a prima facie case against 
defendant, the Court must, as required by 
Rule 17(o), dismiss the charge. . . . 
Smith, 675 P.2d at 524. 
In State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216 (Utah 1976), the Utah 
Supreme Court stated: 
In order to submit a question to the jury 
it is necessary that the prosecution 
establish a prima facie case, That is, it is 
necessary to present some evidence of every 
element needed to make out a cause of action, 
and it has long been established that such 
may be proven by direct or circumstantial 
evidence. But the evidence required need be 
only that which is sufficient to conform to 
the statutory definition of the crime 
charged, and the "element of each offense" is 
defined as (a) conduct, attendant 
circumstances, or results of conduct; and (b) 
the requisite mental state. 
Romerof 554 P.2d at 217 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted); see 
also State v. Noren, 704 P.2d 568, 570 (Utah 1985). 
While the State may be required to show some evidence 
of every element to avoid a directed verdict, it is not required, 
at that point, to prove an absence of self-defense. In State v. 
Knoll, 712 P.2d 211, 214 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court 
held: 
Absence of self-defense is not an element of 
a homicide offense. As a matter of statutory 
construction, S 76-5-201 [and §76-5-203] do[] 
not make absence of self-defense a prima 
facie element of a homicide crime. Rather, 
self-defense is a justification for a killing 
and a "defense to prosecution." §76-2-401; 
see §76-2-402. Furthermore, appellant's 
argument would force the prosecution to prove 
a negative in a homicide offense, a burden 
the law does not often impose. In short, we 
hold that the absence of self-defense is not 
one of the prima facie elements of homicide. 
Knoll, 712 P.2d at 214 (emphasis in original). Plainly, the law 
does not require the State to prove the absence of self-defense 
in order to survive a motion for directed verdict at the close of 
the State's case in chief. At that point, the State must only 
have presented some evidence to establish every element of a 
cause of action, not have proven beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the killing was not in self-defense. 
The record demonstrates, and defendant does not 
dispute, that the State presented "some evidence" of every 
statutory element of manslaughter, a lesser included offense of 
the charged offense. The State was not required at this stage of 
the proceeding to establish the absence of self-defense. Since 
the State satisfied its requisite burden, the trial court 
properly denied defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal. 
This is even more true because of the fact that this 
case was tried to the bench instead of to a jury. The trial 
court had the right, especially sitting without a jury, to 
consider not only the charged offense but any lesser included 
offenses in his decision. As the Utah Supreme Court said in 
State v. Dyer, 671 P.2d 142 (Utah 1983): 
This Court has recognized on numerous 
occasions the prerogative of the trial court 
to . . . consider lesser included offenses 
whenever the interest of justice so requires. 
Dyer, 671 at 145 (footnote omitted). In the present case, the 
trial court had the prerogative to consider lesser included 
offenses in determining whether the State had presented evidence 
to establish the prima facie elements making out a cause of 
action. 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT 
DEFENDANT OF MANSLAUGHTER. 
The issues raised by defendant in Points II and III on 
appeal are the same for all practical purposes. In Point II, 
defendant claims that the evidence presented at trial was 
insufficient to sustain the trial court's verdict of 
manslaughter. In Point III, defendant claims that the trial 
court erred by denying a motion for new trial on grounds of 
insufficient evidence. Therefore, if the evidence was sufficient 
to support the verdict, then necessarily, the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion for new trial. 
The standard of review in bench trials has recently 
been clarified in accordance with Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
52(a), as applied to criminal cases by virtue of Utah Code Ann. S 
77-35-26(g) (1982). The Utah Supreme Court held in State v. 
Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987), that, in reviewing an 
insufficiency of evidence claim, the appellate court must not set 
aside the lower court's verdict unless it is clearly erroneous. 
Walker, 743 P.2d at 193. See also State v. Featherson, No. 
880091 Slip Op. (Utah, Sept. 29, 1989); State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 
1255, 1258 (Utah 1987). The clearly erroneous standard requires 
that "if the findings (or the trial court's verdict in a criminal 
case) are against the clear weight of the evidence, or if the 
appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction 
that a mistake has been made, the findings (or verdict) will be 
set aside." Walker, 743 P.2d at 193. However, as this Court has 
noted, the application of this standard to bench trials "does not 
eliminate the traditional deference afforded the fact finder to 
determine the credibility of witnesses." State v. Wright, 744 
P.2d 315, 317 (Utah App. 1987) (citing Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure 52(a); State v. Baqley, 681 P.2d 1242, 1244 (Utah 1984) 
("it is not our function to determine the credibility of 
conflicting evidence or the reasonable inference to be drawn 
therefrom")); see also State v. Watts, 675 P.2d 566 (Utah 1983). 
The trial court correctly found defendant guilty of 
manslaughter, as that finding was sufficiently supported by the 
evidence. The evidence adduced at trial established each element 
of the crime, including the absence of self-defense. Utah Code 
Ann. S 76-5-205 (Supp. 1989) provides in pertinent part: 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes 
manslaughter if the actor: 
(a) recklessly causes the death of 
another; or 
(b) causes the death of another under 
the influence of extreme emotional 
disturbance for which there is a reasonable 
explanation or excuse; or 
(c) causes the death of another under 
circumstances where the actor reasonably 
believes the circumstances provide a legal 
justification or excuse for his conduct 
although the conduct is not legally 
justifiable or excusable under existing 
circumstances. 
(2) Under Subsection (l)(b), emotional 
disturbance does not include a condition 
resulting from mental illness as defined in 
Section 76-2-305. 
(3) The reasonableness of an explanation or 
excuse under Subsection (l)(c), shall be 
determined from the viewpoint of a reasonable 
person under the then existing circumstances. 
While it is not entirely clear which subsection was used by the 
trial court to support its decision, defendant does not claim 
that the State failed to establish any specific statutory 
element. Defendant's only contention is that the State failed to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of self-defense as 
required by State v. Knoll, 712 P.2d 211 (Utah 1985). 
In Knollf the Utah Supreme Court held that the "absence 
of self-defense is not one of the prima facie elements of 
homicide.- Knoll, 712 P.2d at 214. Nonetheless, in conformity 
with constitutional requirements, if the issue of self-defense is 
raised, "the prosecution has the burden to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the killing was not in self-defense." 
Knoll, 712 P.2d at 214 (citations omitted). 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-2-402 (1978) provides that 
(1) A person is justified in threatening 
or using force against another when and to 
the extent that he reasonably believes that 
such force is necessary to defend himself . . 
. against such other's imminent use of 
unlawful force; however, a person is 
justified in using force which is intended or 
likely to cause death or serious bodily 
injury only if he reasonably believes that 
the force is necessary to prevent death or 
serious bodily injury to himself . . ., or to 
prevent the commission of forcible felony. 
(emphasis added). Under this statute, defendant was only 
justified in using deadly force if Mr. Strieby's attack was 
imminent and if defendant reasonably believed that deadly force 
was necessary to prevent death or serious bodily injury to 
herself. While there was some evidence of self-defense adduced 
at trial, that defense was disproved, beyond a reasonable doubt, 
by the clear weight of the evidence to the contrary. 
There is little dispute that defendant and Mr. Strieby 
had battled the night before and earlier in the day of the 
shooting (R. 136 at 68-70 and St. Exh. #14 at 2). Early in the 
day of the shooting, defendant had threatened to kill Mr. 
Strieby, "as soon as she got her hands on a gun" (R. 136 at 79). 
As to what occurred just prior to the shooting, the trial court 
had little but the defendant's statement to police and later 
trial testimony to rely on. There was evidence that what 
happened happened quickly. Mr. Strieby's nephew testified that 
he left right around 6:30 p.m. and the call to the sheriff's 
office was logged at 6:38 p.m. (R. 136 at 110-11 and 13). Prior 
to the call, Sandy McGanna, a neighbor of the Striebys, had 
watched defendant walk from her own condominium to McGanna's—a 
task which took some time (R. 136 at 126-29). The defendant also 
testified that she had knocked on the door of another neighbor 
first but received no answer (St. Exh. #14 at 3). That left 
little time for the pitched battle which defendant testified 
occurred. The time span supports the trial court's finding that 
the argument was Mperhaps not of the magnitude as perceived by 
Mrs. Strieby." (R. 137 at 323). 
The trial court's verdict of manslaughter was based 
primarily on defendant's testimony that Mr. Strieby had broken 
off any physical confrontation with defendant prior to the time 
that she ran up the stairs and retrieved the gun, and on the fact 
that he was so impaired from drinking that she had been able to 
elude him at least twice during the confrontation (R. 137 at 
323). Even accepting defendant's testimony at face value 
(ignoring the fact that it differed so from her statement given 
to the police immediately after the shooting), the clear weight 
of the evidence supports the trial court's verdict. Defendant 
testified that Mr. Strieby pulled her down the lower flight of 
stairs, but that she then kicked at him and he lost his balance 
(R. 137 at 242). He doubled his fist and swung at her, but she 
moved and he "went clear to the stairs with his fist." (R. 137 at 
242). She pushed him again and he went to the kitchen (R. 137 at 
242). 
She also testified that he was shaking her and she 
"pushed him away, and he'd lose his balance. He slid down the 
wall once." (R. 137 at 243). She kicked him in the groin and he 
went into the kitchen (R. 137 at 243). In the course of her 
testimony, she said several times that he left her and went into 
the kitchen (R. 137 at 242, 243, 245 and 267). While he 
obviously only went into the kitchen once, it was at that point 
that Mr. Strieby had ceased any assault on defendant and she had 
the opportunity to leave the house or to call and summon help (R. 
137 at 323-25). She did not take that opportunity, but instead, 
ran up the stairs and got the gun which she knew was in the 
bedroom (R. 137 at 246). She also knew that the gun was loaded 
(R. 137 at 271-73). As the trial court said: 
There was no physical evidence that Mrs. 
Strieby had, other than initially, tried any 
vigorous efforts to escape the condo, to 
shout, to holler, to seek the assistance of 
others. There was no evidence in the record 
to suggest that she had used objects of 
furniture or anything else in the house to 
fend him off or to take any evasive action. 
But rather that she went up the stairs and 
got the gun at a time when he wasn't in 
vigorous, hot pursuit. 
(R. 137 at 325). 
While defendant may have been justified in pushing and 
shoving Mr. Strieby in response to his pushing her, the use of a 
gun is justified only in extreme circumstances. As explained in 
section 76-2-402, a person is justified in using force against 
another when she reasonably believes that such force is necessary 
to defend herself against another's imminent use of unlawful 
force. The theory of self-defense may have justified defendant 
striking back if Mr. Strieby struck her or grabbed her arms. 
However, to justify going upstairs and retrieving a loaded 
pistol, defendant would have to have reasonably believed that the 
gun was necessary to prevent imminent death or serious bodily 
injury to herself. She testified that Mr. Strieby said that he 
was going to kill her, but that the statement was made as he left 
her and went into the kitchen (R. 137 at 243). He did not have a 
gun, nor did he threaten to get a weapon or gun (R. 137 at 280). 
Defendant had a route through which to escape after Mr. Strieby 
went into the kitchen; thus, the trial court was correct in 
finding that she could not have reasonably believed that shooting 
Mr. Strieby was necessary to prevent death or serious bodily 
injury to herself. Leaving the condominium would have prevented 
any perceived threat from being carried out. 
Defendant makes much of the trial court's reference to 
the cap and the blue plastic cup found near Mr. Strieby's body 
and claims that the court made up a theory about the cup which, 
he says, His not supported by a scintilla of evidence." (Br. of 
App. at 18). This is not the case. The evidence that a cap and 
the blue cup, with a wet spot next to it, was presented at trial 
(R. 136 at 143). Given the defendant's testimony that Mr. 
Strieby had broken off the confrontation and gone into the 
kitchen, and that the Striebys had several similar cups, the 
trial court could reasonably infer that Mr. Strieby had the cup 
with liquid in it as he walked up the stairs. This further 
supported the trial court's finding that Mr. Strieby no longer 
was a physical threat to defendant and the use of deadly force 
was not justified. 
The clear weight of the evidence supported the trial 
court's verdict. That evidence demonstrated that Mr. Strieby's 
drinking had impaired him to the point that defendant had been 
able to avoid his physical threats. It also demonstrated that 
Mr. Strieby was no longer imminently threatening physical harm to 
defendant, but, instead, had gone into the kitchen and poured a 
drink (whether alcoholic or nonalcoholic is immaterial). This 
made him less able to carry out his threats (R. 136 at 117). The 
apparent injuries, which defendant tried to claim at trial were 
caused by a struggle at the condominium, were observed earlier, 
after the fight at Mr. Strieby's father's trailer (R. 136 at 75-
79, 52-54 and 105). The condominium showed no signs of the 
struggle which defendant claimed had occurred (R. 136 at 24 and 
112). Defendant also testified of numerous previous fights 
between Mr. Strieby and herself and that all of these fights had 
been settled far short of using deadly force (R. 137 at 257-58). 
All of this evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom support 
the verdict and make it clear that no mistake has been made in 
this verdict. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
WHEN IT DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR NEW 
TRIAL. 
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in not 
granting her motion for new trial based on her claim that the 
evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. Rule 24 of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides for a new trial Min the 
interest of justice if there is any error or impropriety which 
had a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a party." 
Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-24(a) (1982). The decision to grant or 
deny a motion for new trial in a criminal proceeding is left to 
the sound discretion of the trial court, which should not be 
disturbed in the absence of abuse of such discretion. See State 
v, Lairby, 699 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1984) (overruled on other grounds 
in State v. Ossanaf 739 P.2d 628 (Utah 1987)); State v. Bundy, 
589 P.2d 760 (Utah 1978). Because the evidence was sufficient to 
support the verdict, as argued in point I above, this issue is 
without merit. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER OF RESTITUTION WAS 
PROPER IN THIS MATTER. 
In her final argument, defendant contends that the 
trial court erred by ordering restitution pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. S 76-3-201 (Supp. 1989). Utah Code Ann. S 76-3-201(3)(a)(i) 
provides in pertinent part: 
When a person is adjudged guilty of criminal 
activity which has resulted in pecuniary 
damages, in addition to any other sentence it 
may impose, the court shall order that the 
defendant make restitution up to double the 
amount of pecuniary damages to the victim or 
victims of the offense of which the defendant 
has pleaded guilty, is convicted, or to the 
victim of any other criminal conduct admitted 
by the defendant to the sentencing court 
unless the court in applying the criteria in 
Subsection (3)(b) finds that restitution is 
inappropriate. Whether the court determines 
that restitution is appropriate or 
inappropriate, the court shall make the 
reasons for the decision a part of the court 
record. 
While the defendant may have argued against the 
imposition of restitution during the sentencing proceeding, no 
o 
formal objection to the court's order of restitution was made. 
o 
Notably, when the court ordered restitution it did not fix 
the amount or the potential beneficiaries, but left that 
determination to the Board of Pardons at the time of defendant's 
release: 
With respect to the issue of restitution, 
the Court will provide in the order that she 
_ o - 7 _ 
Therefore, defendant has waived her right to challenge that 
order. See State v. Snyder, 747 P.2d 417, 421 (Utah 1987) 
("Defendant lodged no objection to the imposition, amount, or 
distribution of the restitution ordered. Nor did he request a 
hearing on the issue. . . . He thus waived the right he had to 
challenge the order of restitution.M). 
If this Court were to overlook the fact that defendant 
did not preserve this issue for appeal, it is clear that the 
order made in this case was appropriate. Section 76-3-201 allows 
for the discretion of the trial court in ordering restitution. 
As the Supreme Court 6aid in Snyder: 
It lies within the discretion of the trial 
court to impose sentence or a combination of 
sentences which may include the payment of a 
fine, restitution, probation, or 
imprisonment. However, upon conviction of a 
crime which has resulted in pecuniary 
damages, in addition to any other sentence 
imposed, the trial court is statutorily 
mandated to order the payment of restitution 
unless the court finds that restitution is 
inappropriate. 
Snyder, 747 P.2d at 420 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
Thus, the trial court was obligated to assess restitution unless 
Cont. 
pay such restitution as may be fixed and 
assessed by the board at time of release. 
And I'll leave that open, leave it up to them 
to hold a restitution hearing at the time of 
release. 
(R. 137 at 343). While the trial court may have erred by not 
making part of the record the reason for restitution, under the 
circumstances, the defendant was not detrimentally affected by 
the court's action, and any error would be harmless. See Rule 
30, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-30 
(1982)) ("any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does 
not affect the substantial rights of a party shall be 
disregarded"); State v. Snyder, 747 P.2d 417, 421 (Utah 1987). 
The trial court did err by not giving its reasons for 
ordering restitution but that error was not prejudicial and does 
not require reversal. In Snyder, the court said: 
Subsection 76-3-201(3)(a) was amended in 
1983 to require that trial courts make the 
reasons for restitution orders part of their 
written orders. Thus, in this case, it was 
error for the trial court not to set forth in 
writing its reasons for ordering restitution. 
However, the record reflects that the error 
was not prejudicial. 
Snyder, 747 P.2d at 421 (footnotes omitted). In Snyder, the 
court found that defendant had not lodged an objection to the 
restitution ordered, or requested a restitution hearing. He had 
argued that being placed on probation "would enhance his ability 
to make restitution." Snyder, 747 P.2d at 421. The court found 
that there was evidence that Snyder had assets from which 
restitution could be made and that Snyder's contention that 
restitution for victims not named in the information was 
inappropriate was without merit. Snyder, 747 at 421. As the 
court reiterated, restitution is to be awarded to any victim who 
has suffered pecuniary damages as a result of defendant's 
criminal activities, Utah Code Ann. S 76-3-201(4); Snyder, 747 
P.2d at 421. Pecuniary damages are those damages which a person 
could recover from defendant in a civil action arising out of the 
facts of the criminal activity, Utah Code Ann. S 76-3-201(4). 
As in the Snyder case, the restitution order in this 
case was appropriate. The requested restitution is for funeral 
expenses and for counseling for Mr. Strieby's daughter who was in 
therapy for children of homicide victims (R. 137 at 334-35). 
These expenses would be recoverable in a civil action against 
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defendant for the wrongful death of Mr. Strieby. While defendant 
would be unemployed during her incarceration, evidence at trial 
and the presentence report showed that she had held employment 
consistently in the past. The trial court could have reasonably 
assumed that she would be employed in future after her parole. 
The court fashioned a restitution order which allowed for a 
review of her situation at the time of defendant's release from 
prison. The order was similar to the one approved by the Supreme 
Court in Snyder, about which the court said: 
The flexibility in the order which permits 
the individual amounts of restitution to be 
determined either by agreement, by 
litigation, or by order of the court comports 
with good sentencing practice and protects 
the interests of all concerned. The order 
does not exceed the authority prescribed by 
law, nor does it constitute an abuse of the 
trial court's discretion. Consequently, we 
do not disturb it. 
Snyder, 747 P.2d at 422. The restitution order in the present 
case provides flexibility to tailor the order to defendant's 
circumstances while protecting the rights of those victims who 
suffered pecuniary damages as a result of defendant's criminal 
activities. The order does not exceed the court's authority nor 
is it an abuse of the court's discretion; this Court should 
affirm the order. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests 
that this Court affirm defendant's conviction. 
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